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THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN
CONTROLLED FIRMS IN INDIA: PRELIMINARY
INTERVIEW EVIDENCER
Vikramaditya Khanna * and Shaun J. Mathew

**

The role of independent directorshas come under the scannerfollowing the
Satyam debacle, and the en masseresignationof independent directors that
followed. ProfessorKhanna and Mr.Mathew argue, on the basis of extensive
interview evidence, that there is no clear understandingof the role that an
independent director is expected to play in the boardroom. Further,they
demonstratethatdoubts over the applicabilityofcivil and criminalliabilitylaws
to independentdirectorsare often a causeofconcern, and arguethatthese concerns
must be addressedin the proposedreform to India'scompany legislation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the pendulum swung both ways for India Inc. There was much
good news - corporate India came out of the global financial crisis smelling like a
rose, with the Sensex surpassing its pre-crisis heights and India's economic growth
rates far exceeding most estimates.' However, 2009 was also a watershed year in
the "bad news" category, with revelations of the biggest scandal in corporate
India's history at Satyam Computer Services and the travails of Nimesh Kampani
relating to his service as an independent director at Nagarjuna Finance
dominating the headlines and eroding confidence in corporate India both
domestically and overseas.2
These events attracted significant public attention to and invited the scrutiny
of India's independent directors, and many of these independent directors took
notice: at least 620 independent directors resigned from the boards of Indian
companies in 2009 - a figure that is, to our knowledge, by far without precedent
globally.' This exodus of independent directors highlighted a deep discomfort
within corporate India with the very institution of independent directors in the
context of companies controlled, directly or indirectly, by corporate founders, or
promoters.4

1
2

3

4

See, A. Satapathy & A. Bharadwaj, Business Diary 2009, ZEENEWS.COM, Dec. 28, 2009,
available at http://www.zeenews.com/news589650.html.
See, P. Banerji, Scandal Jolts Confidence of Global Investing Community, THE FINANCIAL
EXPRESS, Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/news/scandaljolts-confidence-of-global-investing-community/407876/. See Part II below for more
detail on these events.
Tabulated based on data available at http://directorsdatabase.com. For our
purposes, we only counted cessations listed in the database for which the reason
listed was "resignation."
Explanation I of sub clauses (k) and (1), Clause 6.8.3.2, Securities and Exchange
Board of India (Disclosure and Investor Protection), 2000, defines the term
'promoter' to include: (a) the person or persons who are in over-all control of the
company; (b) the person or persons who are instrumental in the formulation of a
plan or programme pursuant to which the securities are offered to the public; (c)
the persons or persons named in the prospectus as promoter(s). Provided that a
director/officer of the issuer company or person, if they are acting as such merely
in their professional capacity, shall not be included in the Explanation.
36
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But what exactly is the appropriate role of an independent director in a
controlled company? The academic literature suggests at least two distinct, but
not necessarily mutually exclusive, roles: (i) independent directors may be seen
as watchful monitors of promoters and management on behalf of public
shareholders or (ii) independent directors may be viewed as reservoirs of
strategic advice intended to aid promoters and managers in maximizing overall
firm value.5 While Indian listing standards require that the boards of listed
companies include independent directors,' neither the listing standards, nor
the Companies Act, prescribe a particular role for independent directors vis-6vis the executives, promoter-affiliated directors or the public shareholders, or
define the contours of their liability with any real precision. In light of this
uncertainty, we decided to examine the role of independent directors in Indian
companies firsthand. Through interviews with independent directors, at both
controlled and dispersely held firms in India (and also some in the United States),
Indian promoters, and some of India's leading corporate lawyers and board
advisors, our project intends to understand firsthand what the role of
independent directors in India is today and what these groups think such role
should be going forward.
While our interview research remains preliminary - and forms part of a
much larger project on which we are collaborating with Rajiv Luthra, the founder
and managing partner of Luthra & Luthra Law Offices in New Delhi - we have
already observed some interesting results:
(i)

All of the independent directors viewed their role principally
as that of strategic advisors to the promoters.
(ii) Relatedly, most independent directors did not perceive their
role to be that of a "watchdog" over the promoters and
management. Reasons cited by directors against such a role
ranged from the practical (lack of time or resources or training)
to the philosophical (not good for board collegiality and
functioning). Moreover, many of them believed that any legal
requirement imposing such a role would be highly
inappropriate given that the current scope for independent
director liability was perceived to be very high (and included a
bona fide, nontrivial risk of criminal liability), sometimes
arbitrarily imposed, and not offset by adequate remuneration
and directors and officers insurance coverage.
5
6

See generally, J.N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of ShareholderValue and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465 (2007).
See, Clause 49(I)(A) of the Listing Agreement available at: http://www.bseindia.com/

downloads/Listagree.zip [hereinafter "Listing Agreement"].
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(iii) With respect to liability, almost all of the independent directors
desired seemingly basic protections against being served arrest
warrants based on claims of corporate malfeasance clearly
outside the independent directors' control, such as bounced
checks and factory accidents, and clear safe harbors that would
insulate them from liability for reliance on information provided
by auditors and management.
(iv) Particularly in light of the liability risk, every one of the directors
and advisors we interviewed found independent director
compensation to be grossly inadequate and incommensurate
to the attendant risks.
(v) Most of the independent directors described the boardroom
environment as being receptive of their viewpoints, particularly
in the post-Satyam era; indeed, several directors relayed
anecdotes in which boards and promoters took action initiated
or driven by the independent directors. While many of these
situations involved the proposal of new strategic initiatives,
rather than conflict situations, directors did share experiences
in which independent director opposition to a promoter's plan
caused a reconsideration or even abandonment of such plans.
(vi) Many of the independent directors agreed that selecting
independent directors through an independent nominating
committee could help counteract the promoter's influence on
independent directors, although most agreed this would only
operate to a very limited extent.
(vii) Changes in the post-Satyam environment included more
fulsome board discussions (accompanied by more presentation
and discussion of data) and a perceived greater appetite for
seeking out and listening to alternative and dissenting
viewpoints by promoters.
(viii) Most directors and advisors suggested that the mass
independent director resignations of 2009 were indicative of a
panic overreaction. Directors differed, however, in their views
of the potential signaling effect and impact of the threat by an
7

Although the actual imposition of such criminal or civil liability by the government
was infrequent, the risk of arrest and the concomitant delay, anxiety, distraction,
harassment, and reputational harm was quite substantial.
38
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independent director to resign; while most agreed a director
resignation sends a clear signal to the market, particularly in
the current environment, most also viewed the Indian financial
press (and their readers) as having very short memories,
thereby diminishing what would otherwise be an effective
signal of conflict in the boardroom.
(ix) The directors described their communication with minority
shareholders (if any took place at all) to be extremely limited,
with the vast majority of any such communication taking place
with foreign institutional investors.
(x) Some independent directors found training materials and
resources, both internally and externally, to be insufficient for
purposes of induction and keeping abreast of current
developments and best practices.
Although these findings are preliminary, they suggest that directors view
their primary role as being strategic advisors and that imposing a serious
monitoring duty on them would be almost unequivocally opposed and perceived
as impractical, detrimental to board functioning, and, perhaps most
importantly, contrary to the realities of modern board service. Our findings
also highlight the very strong and universal desire of independent directors to
have relatively clear guidance on their duties together with some constraints
on liability (especially the power to arrest and criminal liability). We hope
these findings - supplemented by the more detailed and rigorous findings we
expect will accompany our broader report - will help directors, regulators,
promoters and investors in better understanding the institution of independent
directors in the context of controlled firms and in crafting regulations, board
governance policies and norms that better serve the interests of both promoters
and public shareholders in controlled Indian firms.
This paper is organized as follows. Part II chronicles the mass resignations
of Indian independent directors in 2009 and the Satyam and Nimesh Kampani
episodes that precipitated them. We then, in Part III, commence our search for
understanding the role of independent directors in the corporate governance
literature of the United States and India. Part IV investigates how Indian law
views the role of independent directors, and briefly explores current reform efforts
that have been spawned out of the post-Satyam and Nimesh Kampani era. Parts
V and VI describe our interview process and our preliminary results. Part VII
concludes our study.
39
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MASS RESIGNATIONS OF INDIAN INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS IN

2009

In the wake of two major scandals, corporate India witnessed an
unprecedented exodus of independent directors from the boards of Indian
companies in 2009. This Part briefly chronicles these events and sets forth some
potential implications of the mass resignations.
On January 7, 2009, B. Ramalinga Raju, the founder and then-chairman of
Satyam Computer Services, confessed to having orchestrated an accounting fraud
on Satyam's books that the Indian Government now estimates may have cost
investors as much as Rs. 14,000 crore (approximately US$3 billion based on current
exchange rates).' Dubbed "India's Enron"' and now widely perceived as the biggest
fraud in the history of corporate India, Raju's alleged malfeasances included the
fabrication of approximately US$1 billion in cash on Satyam's balance sheet. 0 In
the wake of Raju's confession, Indian authorities arrested Raju, Satyam's managing
director and its chief financial officer as well as two PricewaterhouseCoopers
auditors." The State of Andhra Pradesh charged Raju and the others with criminal
breach of trust, criminal conspiracy, cheating, falsification of records and forgery,12
and investigations were separately launched by the Securities & Exchange Board
of India (SEBI), the Ministry of Company Affairs, the Government of India and the
Serious Frauds Investigation Office (SFIO), among others.' At the time of this
writing, Raju and the other defendants await trial in Indian prison.14
8

9

See, C.R. Sukumar, Rs 4,739 cr more fraud in Satyam: CBI, LIVEMINT, Nov. 25, 2009,
available at http://www.livemint.com/2009/11/25001310/Rs4739-cr-more-fraud-inSatya.html; S. Tibken, Satyam Scandal Shocks IT Sector, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 8,
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123135583835961599.html.
See, India'sEnron: CorporateGovernance, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 2009, at 57. Although
the monicker as "India's Enron" captures the scale and surprise of the wrongdoing,

10
11
12
13
14

there are important differences between the Enron scandal and Satyam. See, V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present & Future?, 1 JINDAL GLOBAL LAW
REVIEW 171 (2009).
See, G. Anand, How Satyam was Saved, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Apr. 14, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123960834835313077.html.
See, R. Guha and J. S. Kumar, Satyam's Raju Brothers jailed, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan.
10, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123157680420571007.html.
See, Sukumar, supra note 8; see also, V. Umakanth, A Cautionary Tale of the Transplant
Effect on Indian CorporateGovernance, 21(1) NAT. L. SCH. IND. REV. 1, 33 (2009).
See, Sukumar, supra note 8; Umakanth, supra note 12, at 33.
See, Sukumar, supra note 8; Satyam moves on, Raju awaits trial, THE EcoNoMIc TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2010, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/infotech/software/
Satyam-moves-on-Raju-awaits-trial/articleshow/5416988.cms.
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Notably absent from those immediately charged and imprisoned in
connection with the scandal were Satyam's independent directors." However,
this gold-plated group, which included a Harvard Business School professor, the
then-dean of the Indian School of Business and a former Indian cabinet secretary,
all either resigned or were replaced by the Indian Government in December 2008
and early 2009.16 Without doubt, Satyam's independent directors have suffered
substantial reputational harm and have faced significant public scrutiny for
their failure to detect such a large and ongoing fraud and for their unanimous
approval of the controversial and later-abandoned transactions to acquire two
firms controlled by Satyam's promoters.17
The reputational damage, coupled with the nontrivial risk that these
independent directors may still face liability," led to significant angst among
India's several thousand other independent directors. 19 The aftermath of Satyam
left many independent directors terrified by the perception - correct or not - that
they could be held liable for the bad acts of a rogue promoter that were undertaken
without their knowledge.2 0
Compounding the fears of Indian independent directors in 2009 was the
experience of Nimesh Kampani, one of India's leading investment bankers.
Kampani, the billionaire founder of the JM group of companies, served as an
independent director on the board of Nagarjuna Finance from 1998 to 1999.1 The
promoters and executives of Nagarjuna were later charged under the Andhra
15
16
17

18

See, Sukumar, supra note 8.
See, Three Satyam DirectorsResign, More may Quit, LIVEMINT, Dec. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.livemint.com/2008/12/29144505/Three-Satyam-directors-resign.html
See, Satyam's Independent Directors had Raised Concerns over the Deal, HINDU BUSINESS
LINE, Dec. 19, 2008, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2008/12/19/
stories/2008121951600400.htm; Umakanth, supra note 12, at 35-36.
See, Corp lawyers, CAs hit out at Satyam Independent Directorsfor Quitting, LIVEMINT,
Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://www.livemint.com/2008/12/30164617/Corp-lawyers-

CAs-hit-out-at-S.html.
19

20

21

See, Why Independent Directorsare Quitting in Droves, REDIFF NEWs, Apr. 27,2009, available
at http://www.rediff.com/money/2009/apr/27why-independent-directors-arequitting-in-droves.htm.
In the context of controlled firms, directors may also be concerned that much of
the information they receive is provided by promoters and management. It is not
clear that this needs to be so.
See, C.R. Sukumar and B. Kalesh, Kampani Surprisedat NagarjunaProbe, LIVEMINT, Dec.
23, 2008, available at http://www.livemint.com/2008/12/22234706/Kampani-surprisedat-Nagarjuna.html.
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Pradesh Protection of Creditors Act for failing to repay depositors nearly Rs. 100
crore (-US$20 million) during 2001-2002." Notably, the Andhra Pradesh law
provided for significant jail time as a punishment:
where any financial establishment defaults in the return of a deposit
either in cash or kind, or defaults in the payment of interest, every
person responsible for the management of the affairs of the financial
establishment including the promoter, manager or member of the
financial establishment shall be punished with up to 10 years' imprisonment

and with up to Rs 100,000 fine.23 (emphasis added)
Surprisingly, in addition to charging and arresting the founding promoter
and another affiliated director, the Government also charged Kampani, who
had left the board prior to any of the allegations surfacing.24 Kampani managed
to avoid arrest and jail time by remaining in Dubai for nine months until a
ruling by an Andhra Pradesh court in October 2009 stayed the proceedings

against him. 25
While many have deemed Satyam to be a "one-off" blemish with respect to
India's corporate governance, 26 and while the Nimesh Kampani incident could
be framed as more politically motivated than reflective of a broader trend in
liability of Indian independent directors, 27 the events in Hyderabad in late 2008
and early 2009 had a tremendous and palpable impact on hundreds of
independent directors at Indian companies. Worried that they could be put in
jail, held financially liable and have their reputations tarnished for actions

22
23
24
25

26

See, Govt to Probe NagarjunaFinanceFraudOn 'Top Priority'Basis, LIVEMINT, Jan. 5, 2009,
available at http://www.livemint.com/2009/01/05181016/Govt-to-probe-NagarjunaFinanc.html.
§ 5, Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act,
1999.
See, Sukumar & Kalesh, supra note 21.
See, C.R. Sukumar, Kampani Gets Relief from Andhra Court, LIVEMINT, Oct. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.livemint.com/2009/10/15010515/Kampani-gets-relief-fromAndhr.html.
See, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VOLUNTARY ADOPTION, REPORT OF THE C11
TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2009) [hereinafter "CII Report"] at 1, available
at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/DraftReportNareshChandraCII.pdf

and compare to: P. Haldea, The Naked Truth about Independent Directors, May 2009,
available at www.directorsdatabase.com/IDsMythPH.pdf.
27

See, Govt. Targeting Kampanifor Eenadu Links,

TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 21, 2009, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/Govt-targeting-Kampani-forEenadu-links/articleshow/4160853.cms.
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perpetuated without their knowledge by promoters, many of these independent
directors began resigning en masse.2 8
Indeed, from the date of Raju's confession through January 8, 2010, 935 of
India's independent directors left the boards of Indian companies, of which 619
departures were classified as resignations. 29 News reports citing the same
database reported nearly 300 departures by late May, indicating that the rate of
departure hardly abated over the course of the year.3 0
These mass resignations highlight a significant problem for corporate India:
the roles of independent directors in Indian companies and their attendant liability
risks are not well understood. The next Part attempts to explore how the role of
independent directors in controlled companies is envisaged from an academic
perspective.

III.

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS IN CONTROLLED COMPANIES

This Partexamines the academic literature on the role of independent directors
at controlled companies. After identifying the unique governance concerns raised
at controlled companies, we explore various frameworks for understanding
the value and role of independent directors at controlled companies.

A. Governance Concerns at ControlledFirms
It has long been recognized that the kinds and magnitude of governance
concerns vary with the ownership structure of the firm.31 In the corporate context,
most commentators envision two broad types of concerns. Where, as is common
28

See, Reputation at Stake? 340 Independent DirectorsQuit in 2009, BUSINESS

STANDARD, May
14, 2009, available at http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/reputation-atstake-340-independent-directors-quit-in-2009/08/06/61615/on
[hereinafter
"Reputation at Stake"]; 340 independent directors quit in 2009, INDIAN EXPRESS, May 14,
2009, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/340-independent-directorsquit-in-2009/459282/ ("Independent directors know they are not in control of happenings in
the company. Post-Satyam they are apprehensive about their role and resigning from their
positions," Prime Database Managing Director Prithvi Haldea said).

29

See, the Directors Database Chronological Cessation Index, available at http://

30
31

www.directorsdatabase.com/tceased-ind.asp.
See, e.g., Reputations at Stake, supra note 28.
See, J. Armour, H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, What is CorporateLaw? in THE ANATOMY
OF CORPORATE LAw: ACOMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 31 (R. KRAAKMAN ET AL. EDS.,
2ND EDN., 2009); R.J. Gilson & J.N. Gordon, Controlling ControllingShareholders, 152 U.

PA. L. REV. 785, 785 (2003); R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes & A. Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership around the World, 54 J.FIN. 471 (1999).
43
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in India, companies have a controlling shareholder, the principal corporate law
concern is that the controlling shareholder may be able to expropriate the assets
of other shareholders or behave in some other opportunistic or non-value
maximizing manner.3 2 On the other hand, as is more common in the United States,
where companies are dispersely held without a controlling shareholder or group,
the worry is that the management of the firm may be able to expropriate assets of
the shareholders or behave in an opportunistic or non-value maximizing
manner?. Therefore, in exploring the academic literature concerning the role of
independent directors, the important differences in governance concerns between
countries with mainly dispersely held companies, versus those with mainly
controlled companies, must be acknowledged.
For example, in controlled firms, the controller oversees managerial behavior,
and we are therefore less concerned with entrenchment (a matter relevant at
dispersely held firms) and more concerned with the controller extracting value
from minority shareholders through transactions like "freezeout" mergers (the
controller merging the controlled firm with a firm in which the controller already
has a 100% ownership stake) or other self-dealing transactions.' In a similar
vein, in controlled firms there are concerns surrounding related party transactions,
separation of cash flow from voting rights (e.g., dual class structures), and the
relationships between board members and controlling shareholders. However,
at dispersely held firms the concerns are over restrictions on control contests
(and entrenchment), shareholder voting procedures, rules governing the balance
of power between shareholders and the board, executive compensation, and
director independence from management.15 These kinds of differences have led
32

See, S.J. Mathew, Hostile Takeovers in India: New Prospects, Challenges, and Regulatory

Opportunities,3 COLUM. Bus. L.
33
34

35

REV.

800, 833 (2007) (noting that as of December 31,

2006, average ownership percentage of BSE 500 companies was 49.55%).
See, B.R. Cheffins, Law as Bedrock: The Foundationsof an Economy Dominated by Widely
Held PublicCompanies, 23 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1, 12 (2003).
See, V.S. Khanna, Corporate Governance Ratings: One Score, Two Scores, or More?, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 39, 42-43 (2009); see also, Umakanth, supra note 12, at 14-15; R.J. Gilson &
J.N. Gordon, ControllingControlling Shareholders 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 787 (2003); L.
Bebchuk & A. Hamdani, The Elusive Questfor Global Governance Standards,157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1263, 1284 (2009); R. Kraakman, et al., Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and
Enforcement, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business
Discussion Paper Series, 3 available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
olinscenter/papers/644_Kraakman.php.
See, Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 34, at 1284; Khanna, supra note 34, at 42; S.

Bhagat & R. Romano, Event Studies and the Law-Part 1: Technique and Corporate
Litigation, Yale Law School John M. Olin Centerfor Studies in Law, Economics, and Public
Policy Working Papers,Paper259 (2001) availableat http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
lepp-papers/259.
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scholars and policy makers to suggest that although some concerns of controlled
and dispersed firms overlap, many do not, and the appropriate governance
devices are likely to vary significantly across these kinds of firms.
The differences in controlled and dispersely held firms also spill over into
the kinds of frauds most likely to be seen at these firms. For example, frauds like
Enron and WorldCom - where management misrepresents financial performance
to cover up poor performance or to cash in on executive compensation programs
- are more likely at dispersely held firms, while frauds like Parmalat and Satyam
- where the controller covers up expropriation of corporate funds or opportunities
3
through financial misstatements - are more likely at controlled firms?.
Here too,
the methods of addressing these concerns may vary across controlled and
dispersely held firms.
In the context of controlled or promoter-dominated firms in India, we now
seek to explore what roles independent directors play at such firms that may,
among other objectives, help address the unique governance concerns presented
by controlled companies.
B. The Role and PotentialValue ofIndependentDirectors
The academic literature identifies several distinct roles for independent
directors at controlled firms, some of which may address the governance problems
unique to controlled firms identified above, while others address very different
objectives. We address two broad, and sometimes opposing, roles that
independent directors may play in the context of controlled companies: (1) serving
a monitoring, or "watchdog," function on behalf of public shareholders and (2)
serving as a strategic advisor to the controlling shareholder.
"Watchdog" for Public Shareholders. One direct means of addressing the
potential expropriation problem presented by controlled firms is to enlist
independent directors to monitor the behavior of management or controlling
shareholders to reduce the chances that either of them will expropriate or misuse
firm assets in some unfair manner. Academic literature suggests that independent
directors exercise vigilance on behalf of minority shareholders in contexts such
as potential self-dealing transactions involving the controlling shareholder and
the company, as well as minority freeze-out transactions proposed by the

36

See, J.C. Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 21
OXFORD REVIEW OF EcONOMIC POLICY 198 (2005); Khanna, supra note 34, at 44.
45
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controlling shareholder.17 In these contexts, the independent director serves as
the "watchdog" for the company's public shareholders. Even though the director
may not have the voting power to stop these types of activities, he or she has the
power to make public any wrongdoing, and while the controlling shareholder
could remove the director or take other retributive measures, such actions would
likely cause unwanted public scrutiny."
Outside the purely transactional context, independent directors may also
be well suited to maintain standards of professionalism within the boardroom
and promote adherence to best practices of corporate governance.39 This additional
type of monitoring provides public shareholders with added confidence that the
board and the company are not being run informally and casually at the behest
and solely for the interest of the controlling shareholder.

StrategicAdvisor to the ControllingShareholder.Independent directors may
also be viewed as strategic advisors who can provide their expertise and

experience on business matters to the firm's management or controlling
shareholder.4 1 In this role they may serve to enhance firm value by helping the
firm make better business decisions and by helping the firm tap into the director's
wealth of business and political connections.
(i) Competing Roles?
The roles noted above pitch independent directors as trusted strategic
advisors to management or a controlling shareholder (suggesting these directors
37

See, D.C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director,32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 80, 81
(2007) ("In the United States, the [independent director] has traditionallybeen seen as the
solution to the problem of managerial domination of the board".); see also, B.S. Black, R.
Kraakman, A. Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went
Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1750-51 (2000); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 34, at
1284; D.A. DeMott, Guests at the Table?: Independent Directors in Family-Influenced
Public Companies, 33 J.CORP. L. 819, 847 (2008); Gilson & Gordon, supranote 34, at 787;

Gordon, supra note 5, at 1506.
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See, Clarke, supra note 37, at 80.
See, DeMott, supra note 37, at 857; Gordon, supra note 5, at 1513.
See, Clarke, supra note 37, at 81 (noting that a common function of independent
directors is to serve as a "brain trust" or consultant); see also, Gordon, supra note 5,

at 1506. Gordon generally describes the boards of the typical 1950s American
corporation as "knowledgeable parties" who could "serve as a useful sounding board for
the CEO, a kitchen cabinet, and could provide expertise in the face of increasingcomplexity"

Id., at 1514. Note, however, that both Gordon and Clarke question whether
independent consultants might perform this role more effectively and without the
encumbrance of independence. See id., at n.185 and Clarke, supra note 37, at 81.
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are supportive to management and controllers) as well as "watchdogs" (who
might be perceived as less supportive and more antagonistic). These roles are not
easy to balance and indeed may run at odds with each other at times.4 ' This can
be a particular problem if the law is written somewhat vaguely, as then the line
between legitimate business decisions and illegitimate ones could become blurred.
Further, the time needed to be a strategic advisor may differ considerably
from that needed to be a "watchdog". The latter likely requires more ongoing and
consistent oversight, whereas the former may require only more limited and
discrete time commitments. Despite the general perception in the public that
independent directors ought to serve as watchdogs, it would appear that the
strategic advisory role may be more suited to the actual functioning of boards,
given that few boards meet more than once every two months.
Historically, in the United States, independent directors appeared to be more
like strategic advisors to the management of a firm.43 However, with the passage
of time, the increasing influence of corporations in social, political and economic
life, and an increasing focus on shareholder wealth maximization, independent
boards took on more of a monitoring role (along with having "tighter" definitions
of independence)." Gordon suggests that the move toward having more
independent directors, and increasing their tasks to include more monitoring of
management, was related to two developments. First, as firms moved from a
general conception of "stakeholders" to shareholder wealth maximization, there
was increasing focus on share prices as an indication of how well the firm was
doing. Second, this increasing reliance on share prices might have created a strong
short-term bias in management (e.g., to maximize share price right now). The
41

See, e.g., Gordon, Supra note 5, at 1514 ("On this view, a 'monitoringboard' would inject
dissonance and distrust. How could the CEO trust and thus confide in directors whose

ultimate mission was to hold him to account?"); see also, R.C. Nolan, The Legal Control of
Directors' Conflicts of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following
the Higgs Report,6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAw 413 (2005) (suggesting that independent
directors should play only the monitoring role, rather than an advisory role, because
attempting to do both would lead to conflicts and inability to perform the monitoring

43

function, which he deems more natural for independent directors).
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, the Companies Act and the proposed
Companies Bill require a minimum of four meetings a year. The recent Grant
Thornton/FICCI survey indicates that 47% of boards meet 6-8 times a year, 44%
meet 4-5 times a year and 9% greater than 8 times a year. See, FICCI GRANT
THORNTON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEw 2009, availableat http://www.wcgt.in/html/
publications/ficci_gt_cgr.php.
See, Gordon, supra note 5, at Part III.
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See, id.
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presence of an increasingly independent board can help to counteract this
tendency (as independent boards are less dependent on the CEO than inside
directors). Gordon argues further that independent directors can create value
not simply by enhancing their firm's value, but also - as part of a larger system
focused on shareholder wealth maximization - their presence helps other firms
to perform better too. 45
There is clearly tension among the various roles independent directors may
play. We now explore the tension embedded in the concept of independence in the
controlled company context and how it manifests itself in the director selection process.
(ii) Independence and Director Selection
The nomination and selection of independent directors in controlled
companies presents an inherent conflict with the very independence of so-called
independent directors. Because the controlling shareholder either has majority
control or effective voting control, it has the power to nominate, vote for and
replace at its discretion the entire board of directors, including the independent
directors.46 To an outside observer, the products of such a process, the independent
directors, may appear less than fully independent by way of their dependence on
the support of the promoter.4 7 This section explores the concept of independence
and director selection in the controlled company context.
Countries are increasingly defining independence in similar ways.48 Usually,
someone is independent if that person has no financial inter-connectedness with
management or controlling shareholder(s) of a firm. 49 In addition, someone who
has worked for the firm may not be considered independent due to both monetary
and collegial relationships that have existed while that person was at the firm.0

45

See, id. Indeed, the importance and sheer number of independent directors
increased over time as well. In the 1950s, roughly 20% of a board was composed of

independent directors, whereas by the mid-2000s roughly 75% of a board was
composed of independent directors.
46

See, Umakanth, supra note 12, at 14-15.
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See, id., at 22.
See, INSTITUTE OF
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latestnews/ICSI_RecommendationsBook_8dec2009.pdf [hereinafter "ICSI
Report"].
See, R. Kraakman & B.S. Black, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L.

COMPANY SECRETARIES OF INDIA, ICSI RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK (2009), availableat http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/

REV. 1911, 1949 (1996).
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See, id.
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Finally, someone who has business dealings with the firm may not be considered
independent due to the potential conflict of interest that some of those business
dealings might generate.
Although this version of independence (centered on "financial"
independence) appears to be the global norm, there are developments in case law
in the United States suggesting that the definition of independence may be
becoming broader. In the Oracle decision, the Delaware Chancery Court held that
independence is not limited to "financial" independence, but also invokes an
inquiry into other measures of independence, such as social ties and connections."
The key matter for the Court was whether the director can make a decision based
solely on the best interests of the firm, without being influenced by financial,
social or other considerations that are not germane to the firm's best interests.52
A similar concern has recently been echoed by former SEBI Chairman, M.
Damodaran. Although friendships are not defined as material relationships that
would compromise independence, Damodaran points out, "[afriend] might be the
person who is most affected by being on my board and not thinking independently".'
Moreover, if independent directors are to serve as "watchdogs" for public

shareholders, then the concept of independence should be meaningful. One may
think of independence as requiring "both the willingnessand ability to sustain...'rigor
and skeptical objectivity' when its object is sponsoredby or especiallybeneficial to the[controlling

shareholder]"." Technical satisfaction of the various independence requirements
set forth by regulations, of course, does not guarantee this type of performancebased independence." It is therefore critical that the process of selecting
independent directors is attentive to such concerns.

However, this broadened definition of independence provides quite a
demanding test and may result in it being more difficult to find independent
directors who are also competent. The concern is that if a company wants a
director who is well versed in business (especially in the business the firm is
51

52
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The decision is technically relevant to a Special Independent Litigation Committee,
but may portend a broader approach to independence in Delaware in other contexts,
too. See, In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 939-44 (Del. Ch. 2003).
See, id at 944-48.

M. Damodaran, Former SEBI Chairman: "The Courage of Conviction is More Evident
Today', INDLA KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, availableat http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
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india/article.cfm?articleid=4429 [hereinafter "India Knowledge"].
DeMott, supra note 37, at 844.
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See, id.
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conducting) then that probably means it needs to find someone with experience.
Such experience usually comes by working in the industry, which means such
director will have social connections to some people at the firm. Even if one ventures
away from a particular industry, it is likely that the most talented people will be
known and are likely to have social and other connections to many people (it is
rare to find a very talented business person who knows no one). At some level,
this version of independence may make it difficult to find competent and talented
directors who can also be independent.
There has been considerable debate on whether one should allow
shareholders (or some kinds of shareholders) to nominate directors to be on the
board;5 6 however, as one commentator has put it, "it is hard to see how directors
representingminority shareholderscould be elected to the board in thefirst place, unless basic
principles of director selection were changed"." An alternative to modifying the

controlling shareholder's ability to predetermine the director elections - one that
has been adopted at many Indian companies already - is to delegate the director
nomination process to an independent, or at least a majority independent
nominating committee. 0 While director candidates nominated by such a
committee would, of course, ultimately need to be acceptable to the controlling
shareholder to be elected to the board, the fact that nomination of independent
directors is directed solely by independent directors may provide more comfort
that the independence of such independent directors is not compromised by the
director selection process.
(iii) Value of Independent Directors
Although the debate over the role, selection and definition of independent
directors has become a much discussed corporate governance topic, there has
also been an increase in the number of academic studies attempting to quantify
the value of independent directors to firms.59 The studies do not provide consistent
results across countries or sometimes even within countries. 60
56

For general background on this debate, scc gcncrally, L. Bebchuk and S. Hirst, Privatc
Orderingand the Proxy Acccss Dcbatc (November 2009), BUSINEss LAWYER (forthcoming);

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 653, availableat http://ssm.com/

abstract=1513408.
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Clarke, supra note 37, at 80.
The South Korean approach used to provide another method of trying to select
independent directors - it used to require that controlling shareholders' votes
would become worth much less when it came to selecting members for the audit
committee. See, Khanna, supra note 34, at 50.
See, e.g., B.S. Black, H. Jang & W. Kim, Does CorporateGovernance PredictFirms'Market
Values? Evidencefrom Korea, 22 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 366 (2006).
See, id.
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In the United States, studies have often found little to no effect of board
independence on firm value;6 some studies even demonstrate negative correlations
between additional independence and corporate performance. 6 2 Of course, given
the preponderance of dispersely held firms in the United States as compared to
typically promoter-dominated companies in India, US-centered studies on the
value of independent directors may be of limited value - independent directors
indeed may have different effects in such companies.
The results of similar studies in other countries, especially those with
more controlled firms, are surprisingly somewhat mixed. In Russia and Korea,
it appears that board independence is important to firm value.64 In India, studies
have so far provided either somewhat or weakly positive or inconclusive results,
and in Brazil it appears there is either no effect or perhaps even a negative
effect." Although there are plausible explanations for each of these results, the
core point is the same: the value of a particular governance mechanism (e.g.,
independent boards) is likely to vary across firms and across institutional
backgrounds and countries.

61
62
63

See, Clarke, supra note 37, at 75-77 (and footnotes for citations).
See, id. at 75-76.
See, Khanna, supra note 34, at 42; Bebchuck & Hamdani, supra note 34, at 1306-16.
Moreover, most firms in the United States follow similar rules and practices and
thus it may be the case that there is not enough variation in US firm practices to
find any effect. Further, one can view an independent board as just one step in an

entire system of corporate governance and hence finding specific effects of one
part of the system is unlikely. Further, if independent directors have systemic

effects (improving the overall governance system at all firms in a country) then
that would not be picked up in studies that are snapshots of a country at a particular
point in time. Moreover, it is possible that it may be optimal for different firms to

have different board structures so that the differences that might exist are perhaps
64
65

optimal or tending toward it. See, Gordon, supra note 5, at 1508.
See, Khanna, supra note 34, at 48.
See, B.N. Balasubramaniam, B.S. Black & V.S. Khanna, Firm-level CorporateGovernance
in EmergingMarkets: A Case Study of India (Draft, on file with authors)(2009) at 32-33;
K.P Prasanna, Corporate Governance - Independent Directorsand FinancialPerformance:
An EmpiricalAnalysis, INDIAN INSTITUTE OF CAPITAL MARKETS 9TH CAPITAL MARKETS CONFERENCE
PAPER, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=877807 (finding independent directors
had little effect); A. Chakraborty et al., The RelationshipBetween Incentive Compensation
and PerformanceRelated CEO Turnover, 61 J.OF EcON. AND Bus. ELSEVIER 295 (2009) (finding
a greater effect); B.S. Black, A. Gledson de Carvalho & E. Gorga, Does One Size Fit

All in Corporate Governance? Evidence from Brazil, 24-25 (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of
Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-20, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/

abstract=1434116 (Brazil).
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This suggests that one needs to examine the institutional and cultural context
of a country before deciding what roles and liabilities independent directors
should have, and how independent directors may be of value to firms. Part V of
this paper begins this exploration by surveying independent directors at Indian
firms, to learn what they perceive to be their roles and what "value added" they
believe they bring.

IV. How

INDIAN LAW ENVISIONS THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS IN CONTROLLED COMPANIES6 6

We next examine how Indian corporate law, listing standards and
regulations envision the role of independent directors in Indian companies.
A. Overview of CorporateGovernance Requirements in India
Although there have been a number of reforms related to corporate

governance, perhaps the single most important for the growth of independent
directors was the promulgation of Clause 49 of the Stock Exchange Listing
Agreement in 2000 by SEBI.6 7 Clause 49: (i) sets out the requirement for having
independent directors on corporate boards, (ii) defines independence (although
with amendments over the years), and (iii) lays out some specific duties and
obligations of independent directors.6"
(i) Requirements

Under Clause 49, all publicly traded Indian firms with paid up capital above
Rs. 3 crore (-US$ 600,000) are required to have a board composed of at least onethird independent directors.69 Further, publicly traded firms, where the chairman
of the board is an executive of the firm, are required to have a board composed of
at least 50% independent directors. 70
(ii) Definition of Independence
Clause 49 Article I(A)(iii) states that an independent director is a nonexecutive of the firm who:
66
67
68
69
70

See, Khanna, supra note 9.
See, S.N. Ananthasubramanian, New Obligations on PSBs, HINDU BUSINEss LINE, Jan. 13,
2006, availableat http://www.blonnet.com/2006/01/13/stories/2006011302040500.htm.
See, Clause 49, Article I(A)(1) Explanation(i) of the Listing Agreement, supra note 6.
See, Clause 49, Article X(1)(ii) of the Listing Agreement, supra note 6.
See, Clause 49, Article I(A)(i) & (ii) of the Listing Agreement, supra note 6.
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a.

apart from receiving director's remuneration, does not have
any material pecuniary relationships or transactions with the
company, its promoters, its directors, its senior management
or its holding company, its subsidiaries and associates which
may affect independence of the director;

b.

is not related to promoters or persons occupying management
positions at the board level or at one level below the board;

c.

has not been an executive of the company in the immediately
preceding three financial years;

d.

is not a partner or an executive or was not partner or an
executive during the preceding three years, of any of the
following:
i.

the statutory audit firm or the internal audit firm that is
associated with the company, and

ii.

the legal firm(s) and consulting firm(s) that have a material
association with the company.

e.

is not a material supplier, service provider or customer or a
lessor or lessee of the company, which may affect independence
of the director;

f.

is not a substantial shareholder of the company i.e. owning
two percent or more of the block of voting shares;

g.

is not less than 21 years of age.7'

Although this definition bears substantial similarity to standards in many
industrialized countries, including the United States, there has been considerable
discussion in India about whether such a tight definition might foreclose Indian
firms from finding independent and competent directors.' This issue becomes
more critical as one considers the plethora of tasks laid at the feet of directors.
Clause 49 sets out some duties for directors, including reviewing company
efforts to comply with all applicable laws and laying down a general code of
conduct.73 However, Clause 49 imposes the most specific requirements for
independent directors who also serve on the audit committee. Specific duties for

71
72
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See, Clause 49, Article I(A)(iii) of the Listing Agreement, supra note 6.
See, Wanted, Women Directors HINDU BUSINEss LINE, Oct. 29, 2007, available at http://
www.thehindubusinessline.com/mentor/2007/10/29/stories/2007102950361200.htm.
See, Clause 49, Article I (C) of the Listing Agreement, supra note 6.
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audit committee members include overseeing the financial reporting process,
matters related to the appointment of the statutory auditor, reviewing financial
statements with management before submitting them to the board, reviewing
the internal control systems, reviewing internal investigations on suspected
fraud, reviewing the whistle blower mechanism (if any), reviewing disclosure on
use of proceeds from public issuance of securities, reviewing disclosures on related
party transactions, and other related matters." The aforementioned is not
intended to be an exhaustive list of independent directors' responsibilities, but
simply an indication of the breadth of their tasks.
(iii) Liability
Violations of Clause 49 could result in the de-listing of the firm under the
Stock Exchange Listing Agreement. Moreover, violations of the listing agreements
could generate both financial penalties imposed by government and criminal
sanctions for directors under the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act 1956.
Although not yet imposed on any directors in India, the prospect of these higher
sanctions is likely to serve as a signal that more serious enforcement is an
increasing possibility.75
Outside of Clause 49, there are a number of provisions that can be used to
impose liability on directors. These include provisions targeted at directors and
other general provisions for which directors may be prosecuted or otherwise
pursued (this is not meant to be an exhaustive list):7 6
1.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and
Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003,
contains various prohibitions on manipulative, fraudulent and unfair trade
practices in securities (section 4), and a prohibition on dealing in securities
in a fraudulent manner or using any manipulative or deceptive device (or
scheme to defraud or deceit, etc.) in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities (section 3).

74

See, Clause 49, Article 11 (D), Article IV (A) & (D) of the Listing Agreement, supra
note 6.
See, D. Dharmapala & VS. Khanna, Corporate Governance,Enforcement, and Firm Value:
Evidence from India, U. of Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 08005, 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers, 2008, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105732.
Many of the items listed below do not provide a private cause of action for
shareholders (neither do violations of Clause 49).

75

76
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2.

Sections 12A and 15G of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act,
1992, [SEBI Act] prohibit insider trading.77

3.

Sections 62 and 63 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956, could hold directors
liable for certain misstatements in a prospectus to raise capital. 8 There are
also sanctions that SEBI can impose for similar behavior under the Takeover
Code.'

4.

Provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) that cover breach of trust (section
406) and theft and cheating (section 420).

A number of the above can be criminal violations and hence may trigger
arrests and, potentially, convictions for directors. However, private rights of action
for securities fraud are not presently available in India."o Although this provides
a fairly broad list of things for which directors might be held liable, there have, to
date, been very few findings of director liability, either criminal or civil. However,
after the Satyam incident and the arrest of auditors and executives of Satyam, the
perceived risk of potential arrest and liability for directors has increased."
77

78

79
80

Both the Securities Contract (Regulation) Act, 1956 [Hereinafter "SCR Act"] and
the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 [Hereinafter "SEBI Act"] also
provide for penalties when firms fail to address investor grievances sent to them
by SEBI or a stock exchange (§ 23C, the SCR Act and § 15C, the SEBI Act).
To establish liability, the moving party must prove actual reliance on the
misstatement (without the use of the "fraud on the market" theory). See, Peek v.
Gurney, (1873) 43 L Ch 19 (HL); Al-Nakib Investments (Jersey) Ltd. v. Longcroft,
[1990] BCLC 7 (Ch D); Possfund Custodian Trustee Ltd. v. Diamond, [1996] 2 BCLC
665 (Ch D). See, A.RAMAIYA, RAMAIYA's GUIDE TO THE COMPANIES ACT: PART 1 586-587 (Dr.
S.M. Dugar ed., 1998); AVTAR SINGH, COMPANY LAw 113 (2001). In addition, these
provisions are available only for misstatements in a prospectus, not misstatements
generally.
See, § 45(5) and 45(6), SEC. and Exch. Bd. of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares
and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 (SEBI Takeover Code).
See, RESERVE

BANK OF INDIA,

India's Financial Section: An Assessment, available at http://

rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/FRSAIV.pdf. For which alleged
wrongdoing over which SEBI is not empowered to act there may be the availability
of the tort action of deceit or a fraud claim under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
However, both actions require proof of individual reliance without being able to
use the 'fraud on the market' presumption. In context where breach of fiduciary
duty is available that might be pursued, but chances of success are small in India
where few cases have ever been successful. Moreover, for certain breaches of
duties directors may be able to rely on a statutory provision that insulates them
from liability. See, section 633(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1956. See, RAMAIYYA, at
777-779.
81

See, Satyam taught India to fear, LIVEMINT, Jan. 4, 2010, available at http://
www.livemint.com/2010/01/04205958/Satyam-taught-India-to-fear.html.
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B. Recent Reform Efforts
In the wake of the Satyam and Nimesh Kampani episodes, calls for corporate
governance and director liability reform have abounded.8 2 In February 2009, the
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) convened the CII Task Force on Corporate
Governance to "recommend ways offurther improvingcorporategovernance standardsand
practicesin both letter and spirit".' The Task Force, chaired by former Cabinet Secretary
Naresh Chandra, released its findings and recommendations in November 2009.4
The report included recommendations to Indian industry in four areas: (1) the
board of directors, (2) auditors, (3) regulatory agencies and (4) external
institutions.' Similarly, the Council of the Institute of Company Secretaries of
India (ICSI) subsequently promulgated a set of recommendations to reform
corporate governance in light of the events at Satyam.6 Its findings arose out of
its analysis of corporate governance best practices, committee reports and rules
and regulations from around the world and within India." In December 2009,
drawing upon the findings of the CII Task Force and the ICSI report as well as
suggestions from various other stakeholders, India's Ministry of Corporate Affairs
produced a set of voluntary corporate governance guidelines for Indian
companies."" While the guidelines are strictly voluntary, the Ministry expects
that Indian corporations that do not adopt these measures in whole or in part
will explain the reason for their non-adherence in disclosure to their shareholders.
We briefly highlight below some of the findings of these reports.8 9
Nomination Committees. All three of the reports recommend that boards
should select independent directors through a nomination committee comprising
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See, Shocked at Satyam Affair, Chambers Call for Blocking CorporateLoopholes, HINDU
Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2009/
01/08/stories/2009010851250300.htm.
CII Report, supra note 26.
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Other members of the nine-member task force included J.J. Irani, Uday Kotak,
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Y.H. Malegam, Omkar Goswami, Deepak M. Satwalekar, Shardul Shroff, Amal
Ganguli and Ajay Bahl.
See, CII Report, supra note 26, at 3.
See, ICSI Report, supra note 48.
Id.
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See, Corporate Governance Voluntary Guidelines, 2009, Ministry of Corporate
Affairs, Government of India, 24 December 2009; available from http://
www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/CGVoluntaryGuidelines
2009_24dec2009.pdf [hereinafter "Ministry Guidelines"].
Note that the proposed amendments to India's Companies Act does not address
the concerns discussed herein.
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a majority of independent directors, including the chairman.90 They also
recommend that this committee evaluate and recommend individuals for
executive director positions. 91 Current Indian law only requires that companies
maintain independent audit committees, and does not mandate the creation of
independent nomination committees although several companies have
established such committees voluntarily.9 2 Irrespective of a promoter's potential
ability to de facto reject or remove any board appointees using its voting power,
independent directors nominated by an independent committee and without the
influence of controlling shareholders or promoters may instill greater confidence
in the market that independent director nominees remain effectively independent
of promoters.
Executive Sessions. The CII report recommends that independent directors
meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions outside the presence of
management, and that the audit committee should also hold executive sessions
with both internal and external auditors.93 Regular meetings among independent
directors without the presence of management and the promoter may help
encourage independent directors to engage in critical, independent debate about
the company in a setting that eliminates or at least diminishes promoter
interference or intimidation.

Access to Management and Other Resources. The Ministry's Voluntary
Guidelines suggest that independent directors have the option and freedom to
meet with corporate management on a periodic basis. Moreover, these guidelines
recommend that boards make available to independent directors the systems,
procedures and resources necessary to enable independent directors to make
informed, quality decisions about the company and otherwise effectively
discharge their duties.
Remuneration. The Ministry's Guidelines recommend that independent
directors be paid "adequate sitting fees" based both on the company's net worth

90
91
92

93

See, ICSI report, supranote 49, at 23; CII Report, supranote 26, at 6; Ministry Guidelines,
supra note 92.
See, CII Report, supra note 26, at 6.
See, Clause 49 Article II Section A, available at http://www.bseindia.com/whtsnew/
amend_1stagr.asp. Although, in a recent Grant Thornton/FICCI poll at mid-market
listed companies, 56% of the respondents indicated that the appointment of
independent directors was not led by a nomination committee. See, FICCI GRANT
THORNTON, supranote 42.
See, CII Report, supra note 26, at 13.
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and turnover. However, in an effort to prevent a director's independence from
being compromised, these Guidelines expressly discourage the issuance of stock
options or profit-linked compensation. The CII report, on the other hand, would
permit stock options, but would prohibit an independent director from exercising
any such options until a full year after his or her departure from the board.
RelatedParty Transactions.The CII committee also suggested that the audit
committee preapprove all related party transactions not undertaken in the
ordinary course of business or transacted at arm's length. While the
recommendation and its supporting text do not provide any reason for investing
this power in the audit committee other than the fact that it is a majority
independent committee, in light of the events at Satyam and the general concern
over controlling shareholder expropriation of resources, deliberation by an
independent committee or even an executive session of all independent directors
could prove a useful protective measure.94 Indeed, this may be more useful than a
full board meeting and vote in which the powerful influence of the controlling
shareholder could very well diminish the capacity or likelihood of a full and
vigorous debate over the transaction. Recall, the entire board of directors of
Satyam, following an allegedly heated deliberation, voted unanimously'' to
approve the later aborted Maytas related party transactions that precipitated
Raju's confession.96
Independent DirectorLiability.The CII Task Force recommends to regulators
and lawmakers that non-executive directors not be subject to trial for noncompliance with statutory provisions unless a prima facie case can be established
demonstrating that the non-executive director was liable for the non-compliance
on the part of the company, i.e., that the director had knowledge of such noncompliance on the part of the company.9 Along the same lines, a private members'
bill proposing amendments to the Companies Act submitted by the Indian
Merchants' Chamber in February 2009 provides for the insulation of independent
directors of Indian listed companies from liability based on acts or omissions of
94

See, CII Report, supra note 26, at 14; note that the audit committee, however, may
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not be the best place since it is already overloaded with responsibilities.
See, Satyam BoardMinutes DetailsMaytas Decision, INDIA EXPRESS, Jan. 17, 2009, available
at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/satyam-boards-minutes-details-maytas-
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decision/411946/0.
N. Sheth & J. Range, Satyam Minutes Show Directors Raised Questions, WALL STREET
JOURNAL,
Jan. 19, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123201784133485275.html.
See, id.
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the companies on whose boards they sit (or by any officers thereof)." The
amendment also specifically provides that arrest warrants for independent
directors are not to be issued without authorization of at least a District Court
judge who must provide the independent director an opportunity to be heard
prior to issuance of such authorization.9 9 The only exceptions provided are for
breaches or violations of law for which the independent director was "directly
involved in or responsiblefor" or committed with his knowledge or consent, or
where he was guilty of gross fraud or willful negligence."oo Both the Naresh
Chandra recommendation and the draft bill attempt to very directly address
the concerns of directors arising out of the criminal charges levied against
Nimesh Kampani.
ShareholderActivism. The CII Task Force also appeals to institutional
shareholders in particular to be more active in their oversight capacities.' The
Satyam promoters effectively controlled the company with only approximately
8% ownership of the company's equity.102 This may have been enabled by a lack of
pressure or effective oversight (until the very end) by institutional investors.
While dispersed shareholders generally have little incentive to invest the
significant resources required to effectively monitor managements, institutional
shareholders, private equity funds, and hedge funds with significant holdings
have been shown in the United States (and to a lesser, but still significant, extent
in Europe) to be powerful players in shaping governance norms as well as
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Proposed amendment on file with the authors. See also, R.K. Luthra, Retaining talent
on company boards, EcONoMIC TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, available at http://

economictimes.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Editorial/Retaining-talent-on-companyboards/articleshow/4461613.cms.

99 See, id.
100 See, id.
101 See, CII Report, supra note 26, at 24.

102 See, M. Vyas, Beyond Promoter Power, FINANCIAL

EXPREss,

Feb. 2, 2009, available at http:/

/www.financialexpress.com/printer/news/417788/; see also, Mathew, supra note 32,
at 836 (identifying Satyam Computer Services, with its then-reported 9.11%
promoter stake, as the BSE 500 company "most vulnerable to a hostile takeover").
Note that Ramalinga Raju identified the potential threat of a hostile takeover as
one of the reasons he manipulated Satyam's accounts: "Since about seven years we

wanted to show more income in the accounts to avoid othersfrom involving in the company
affairs and any possible hostile acquisition and hence manipulated the balance sheet to
attract more business and showed unavailable amount as available cash on hand." Raju's
Confession: We manipulated balance sheet to avoid acquisition, EcoNoMic TIMES, Jan. 12,
2009, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/infotech/software/RajusConfession-We-manipulated-balance-sheet-to-avoid-acquisition/articleshow/
3969850.cms.
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company-specific reforms. While many institutional investors in the United
States remain passive (due to statutory requirements, their own governing
documents or standard practices), proxy consultants such as RiskMetrics
(formerly ISS) put together voting guidelines based on corporate governance policy
positions that often play a significant role in shaping corporate governance norms
across US corporations. There is perhaps a significant opportunity for such
institutions to develop in India alongside potentially "activist" investors.
Director Training. Both the Ministry's Volmtary Guidelines and the ICSI
report recommend that boards make mandatory training programs for newly
inducted directors and should also develop training programs for the ongoing
development of all directors." The ICSI report suggests that director training is
especially important so that directors become sufficiently technically competent
to perform their duties, including in the area of financial expertise, which the
report suggests is critical to a director's comprehension of the workings of the
audit committee.10 With respect to continuing director development, the ICSI
report suggests directors be kept abreast of recent developments in corporate
governance, technologies, products, markets, etc. through ongoing education, site
visits, seminars and courses.15

V.

INTERVIEWS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

The discussion of academic literature, law and recent reform efforts in the
last few Parts helps to conceptualize and operationalize the roles of independent
directors in Indian firms. We now turn to our most direct means of assessing the
business and institutional context, as well as the practical realities on the ground
through interviews with directors themselves. Through our interviews, we seek
to understand what the role of an independent director in a promoter-controlled
company really is in practice and how it could be improved to serve the goals of
both public and promoter shareholders.
We designed our questions to help us understand the role of independent
directors in India from various perspectives, including the below:
*

Selection Process. How are independent directors selected? Through a
nomination committee? By the promoter? What makes a good candidate?

103 See, ISCI Report, supra note 48.
104 See, id.
105 See, id.
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*

Independence in Action. Provide examples of instances where independent
directors spoke out against an idea or action submitted by promoter.

*

Board Decision-MakingProcess.Describe the role of the independent director
vis-A-vis the promoter and affiliated directors in board decision-making.
Are the voices of independent directors heard and solicited?

*

Strategic Advisor or Watchdog? How do independent directors in promoter
controlled companies view their roles - as strategic advisors, watchdogs,
both, others? How do promoters view the roles of independent directors on
their boards?

*

Director Liability. What are your most palpable concerns about liability?
How have things changed since the Satyam and Nimesh Kampani
incidents? What motivated directors to resign? What worries directors
today? What can bring them back?

*

Director Compensation. Is the current level of independent director
compensation adequate in light of the attendant liability risks?

*

Communication with Public Shareholders. How often, if at all, do you
communicate with public shareholders? Who initiates the conversation?
What is the standard profile of public shareholder with whom you
communicate (foreign institutional investors mainly)?

*

Suggestionsfor Enhancingthe FunctioningofIndependent Directorsin India.
What are your suggestions for things that might help - whether by private
or government initiative - to lead to the more efficient functioning of
independent directors in Indian firms?

*

SignallingEffect of DirectorResignations.To what extent does the resignation
of an independent director signal to shareholders and/or the market that
there may be a conflict on the board?

*

Changesin the Boardroompost-Satyam/Nimesh Kampani.What changes have
you observed in the boardroom environment after the Satyam and Nimesh
Kampani episodes?

Our interview project remains very much in its early stages. To date, we
have conducted interviews with several independent directors at leading BSE
100 companies as well as a number of advisors to corporate boards. Together
with Rajiv Luthra of Luthra & Luthra Law Offices, we plan to expand the pool of
interviewed directors to a minimum of 50 directors, from varying industries. We
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also expect to interview promoter directors, independent directors at controlled
companies in the United States and independent directors at non-controlled
companies in India. We will also seek the advice of India's leading corporate
lawyers, who often advise these promoters and independent directors, as well as
their counterparts in the United States.
Note that our findings below are reported without reference to director
names or company affiliation; we agreed, as a means to encourage open and frank
discussions with our interviewees, to keep their names and any company
identifying information confidential.

VI.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

We set forth below the preliminary findings of our initial subset of
interviews. These are not meant to be construed as definitive conclusions, but
instead only as initial observations that may be helpful as the project and other
similar projects continue.
Watchdog or StrategicAdvisor? All of the independent directors considered
themselves, first and foremost, strategic advisors to the promoters and
management. While several directors indicated "a growing consciousness that you
need to be on the lookout," in the context of a controlled company, as one director put
it, "independent directorsare not there to prevent managementfrom takingdecisions". Indeed,
directors and advisors alike saw the role of the independent director to be that of
a seasoned advisor who could draw on his vast industry or other business or
strategic expertise in helping to advise the company management on both
corporate development and direction, as well as in conflict situations.
While at least one director acknowledged that service on the audit committee
likely required a "watchdog" mentality, all of the independent directors we
interviewed expressed the strong sentiment that they could not be expected to
serve as "watchdogs" in an environment where the potential for significant
reputational damage and the scope of liability - indeed, potentially severe, and
haphazard, criminal liability - is so high and undefined. "We are damn scared,"
summed up one director. The example of Nimesh Kampani was raised on multiple
occasions.
DirectorLiability.Our interviewees emphasized that independent directors
need to be able to rely on the information provided by auditors and management
to some extent; without clear legal protection for reliance on certain types of
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information, they stated emphatically that directors would not be comfortable
serving as watchdogs."o6 This sentiment was often mentioned specifically in the
context of members of audit committees.
The interviews made clear a tremendous uncertainty and confusion as to
the proper role of independent directors in controlled firms and the liabilities
and risks of service. Directors do not appear to have confidence as to whether
their action or inaction while serving on a board could subject them to arrest and
imprisonment for technical violations made by accountants, auditors or members
of management; or even for acts of fraud by any of the foregoing. Several directors
and advisors repeated the startling fact that most independent directors had
probably been served arrest warrants arising out of such claims - this "nuisance
value," as one director put it, had the effect of encouraging director resignations
and discouraging many potentially well-qualified candidates from joining boards.
Providing them with a safe harbor for good faith reliance on certain materials
prepared by management or advisors may be a good start and was recommended
by several directors - "we need clarity in law," said one director. One director
noted that relying on technical rules may not be the best way to solve the problem.
Clear principles that attempt to replicate some of the fiduciary duty concepts
drawn from Delaware law leave less room for technical workarounds and provide
regulators and courts with more flexibility and directors with more comfort that
their good faith service as directors will not land them in prison.'07 Directors and
officers (D&O) insurance is another means for limiting director liability (at least
for State enforced civil liability) - and reports have indicated that over 500 Indian
companies applied for D&O insurance coverage in 2009, further reflecting director
concern over the risks of service."0
Director Compensation. The independent directors all felt that current
compensation levels for independent directors were grossly insufficient and
incommensurate both to the ever-present "nuisance" risk of arrest for corporate
actions outside a director's control and the increased liability risks - perceived or
real - post-Satyam and Nimesh Kampani. Reports indicate that companies are
adopting D&O insurance for directors with rapid frequency; we will be interested
to see in subsequent interviews what changes directors have observed in
compensation, as well as the views of promoters.
106 See, Umakanth, supra note 12, at 29-30.
107 See, Mathew, supra note 32, at 843.
108 See, S. Mody, Companies take coverfor CEOfraud, TIMES OF INDIA, March 4, 2009, available
at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/biz/india-business/Companies-take-coverfor-CEO-fraud/articleshow/4220513.cms.
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Boardroom Environment. The independent directors we interviewed
described the boardroom environment as being receptive of their viewpoints,
and all of them felt that the promoters genuinely valued their input. Many
directors shared experiences in which boards and promoters took action initiated
or driven by independent directors. While these anecdotes mostly involved
strategic initiatives proposed by the independent directors, we did hear from
directors about instances in which an independent director's opposition to a
promoter's plan caused a reconsideration or even abandonment of such plans.
But as one director pointed out, in situations where the promoter's views and
those of the independent director diverge, while the promoter should listen with
respect, given the promoter's significant shareholding position, his view must
ultimately prevail at the end of the day. We hope during the course of our future
interviews to hear and learn more about additional examples of boardroom conflicts
between promoters and independent directors and how they were resolved.
Selection Process. Most directors agreed that independent nominating
committees were important to counteract the impact of promoter hiring and
affinity in the independent director selection process. That said, each director we
interviewed was approached in at least one of his directorships by the promoter
directly, typically in the absence of any process involving a nominating committee
or any independent directors. Moreover, as one director emphasized, to be effective,
boards need to be collegial and therefore cannot select strangers.
The progress and effectiveness of existing nominating committees received
mixed reactions. One director noted that the selection process, while increasingly
delegated to nominating committees, remains effectively a process driven by
individuals rather than the nominating committee. Another noted that while
many well-run companies have nominating committees, management retains a
significant hand in the process.
Changesafter Satyam and Nimesh Kampani.The principal boardroom changes
identified by directors post-Satyam and Nimesh Kampani included the perception
that promoters have generally become more active in welcoming and seeking out
the viewpoints of independent directors. Further, independent directors are
asking questions far more frequently during board meetings and doing much
more to understand the business and actions taken by the board. This is
particularly so when they may not understand the concept being deliberated some directors noted that they knew of several directors on other boards who
never truly understood important concepts such as derivatives, an observation
some attribute to the mass resignations of independent directors post-Satyam
and the replacement of such directors with people who may have less expertise in
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such matters. Board discussions, we learned, are now generally longer, more datadriven, and fulsome. Of course, as mentioned above, this increased vigilance comes
with increased discomfort over playing a watchdog role for which independent
directors feel they are not being adequately compensated or protected.
SignalingEffect of Resignations. The directors and advisors agreed that the
resignation of an independent director sends a signal to the market of some conflict
in the boardroom. They differed, however, in their appraisal of how enduring
and therefore how effective such a signal would be. On one side, we heard that
the financial press would pick up on any such resignation, play out the story, and
likely push deeper into any semblance of conflict or other reason for the director's
departure. The resignations of independent directors at Satyam prior to the Raju
confession and the subsequent press coverage and investigation are paradigmatic
examples of this viewpoint. The power to threaten to resign is from this
perspective a critical factor in encouraging promoters to take into account the
views of independent directors and in deterring promoters from taking actions
perceived as self-interested. In a sense, even if independent directors do not
necessarily have tools to take direct action to block or deter promoter activity
they consider inappropriate, the power to resign enables them to exercise a quite
powerful "watchdog" function. On the other hand, we heard that while the press
would likely pick up on such resignations, its and its readers' memories were too
short, and absent a blockbuster event such as Satyam, it is unlikely that any
serious investigation or significant coverage would be dedicated to such event. In
this view of the world, the indirect watchdog power of the independent director
is decidedly less effective.
Communicationwith PublicShareholders.Many of the independent directors
reported that they had communicated with public shareholders, but on a fairly
ad hoc and infrequent basis and not through any formal channels. Instead, these
interactions typically took place through networks of their own, or meetings
initiated by investors. One interesting finding was that all of the interactions
were with foreign institutional investors - not one had any communication with
domestic shareholders, including institutions. 10 9
Training. Some directors expressed concern that they were not getting
sufficient training or updates on current developments in corporate governance.
While some directors noted that there were resources available, including conferences
and company offsites, some thought those resources were both scarce and generally
109 Note that this does not apply to nominee directors representing banks or other
financial institutions - but we are not considering these to be "independent
directors" for our purposes.
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of poor quality. And, unlike in the US, law firms do not appear to be providing
corporate governance and other update presentations to corporate boards."0
We expect that as we increase the sample size of our interview pool, we will
gain a better and more comprehensive understanding of the concerns of India's
independent directors. Our hope is that this compendium of empirical data - the
first of its kind in India - would prove useful to the Government of India, the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs, SEBI and also to promoters, independent directors
and investors, as they think about how best to define the role of independent
directors in India in the future.

VII. CONCLUSION
As we saw with Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat and with the global
economic crisis we face today, catastrophic events often present lawmakers with
the exceptionally rare political opportunity to reshape entire areas of law and
regulation. Indian lawmakers may well have a similar opportunity today with
regard to reshaping corporate governance in India in the aftermath of the events
at Satyam and Nimesh Kampani. This awesome power must, however, be wielded
thoughtfully and with the knowledge that the general applicability of legislative
creation will likely endure for generations (or at least until the next crisis).
In this study we lay out the findings from our preliminary interviews of
directors. Although these provide useful indicia, they also raise several matters
for further thought and discussion that we intend to address in our broader
survey of independent directors. In particular, we hope to delve more deeply into
what directors consider to be their "value added" to the firm and society how
that should influence their roles and liability risks now and over time, and what
sorts of other facilities may be useful to them to enhance their functioning and
efficiency so that there are both fewer frauds and better firm performance in the
future. We are hopeful that the results of these interviews will provide the Indian
government and regulators with a balanced, but effective, approach to reforming
corporate governance practices in India that will both address the public's desire
to see that severe corporate frauds are detected in advance and prevented, and
help India to retain a flexible corporate governance framework that enables
managers and boards of Indian corporations to continue to foster the dramatic
increases in wealth and standards of living that have characterized India Inc.
since economic liberalization.
110 Although the recent Grant Thornton/FICCI survey indicated that 53% of directors
thought there was a process in place to ensure newly appointed directors got
formal and tailored induction upon joining the board and 57% thought the company
trains directors on the business model and risk profile of the firm. See, FICCI GRANT
THORNTON, supranote 42.
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